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In the present paper, I shall first attempt to reconstruct Dharmakīrti's notion of a yogin's career on the basis of the statements one can find scattered throughout his very influential Pramāṇavārttika. I shall try to draw a coherent picture of both yoga and yogins, from the first insights (prajñā) that take place when still in the stage of an "ordinary person" (pṛthagjana), who is beset by a false view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), to the culmination of the yogic endeavour at emancipation (mukti) and/or enli- 1 The present paper is the fifth in a series of studies of Dharmakīrti's religious philosophy, see Eltschinger 2005a and b, 2007 and forthcoming. Most sincere thanks are due to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Prof. John Taber and Dr. Helmut Krasser, who carefully read through the present paper, and to Mrs Cynthia Peck-Kubacek, who very kindly improved my English. Though I could not do justice to all his suggestions and remarks, I am much indebted to Prof. Eli Franco's very insightful comments on this paper. Since the present study was written in 2005, it did not take into consideration John Dunne's 2006 essay on the yogins' cognition. Dunne's exegetical hypothesis is, however, diametrically opposed to mine. To put it in a nutshell, Dunne argues that "Dharmakīrti does not choose to present yogic perception as a mystical gnosis that encounters or uncovers real things in the world" (Dunne 2006: 500) , or, to put it in other words, that "Dharmakīrti deliberately chooses to downplay the notion that, through spiritual exercises, an adept gains extraordinary sensory abilities" (Dunne 2006: 504) . As I shall try to argue in the second part of this paper, I think that Dharmakīrti actually did hold the opinion that, at the completion of the path, the yogin has a direct perceptual encounter with reality itself. In my opinion, Dharmakīrti inherits from ideas that can be found, e.g., in the Śrāvaka-bhūmi, and which have been summarized recently by Lambert Schmithausen. According to the latter (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79) , "the contemplation process culminates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cognition or insight (pratyakṣaṃ jñānadarśanam) that transcends the mental image and directly apprehends the respective object itself." To be more precise, the path described in the Śrāvakabhūmi "culminates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cognition (pratyakṣajñāna) of the four Noble Truths" (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79 ). Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund in the context of the FWF-Project P19862 ("Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus").
ghtenment (bodhi). The description aims at presenting the religious conceptions that form the background of Dharmakīrti's epistemological account of a yogin's perception (yogipratyakṣa). In the second part of this paper, I shall adduce a new and somewhat provocative hypothesis concerning the still rather unclear subject of the nature of the yogin's cognition. I shall try to show that the properties Dharmakīrti ascribes to a mystic's perception (pratyakṣa), viz., vividness (spaṣṭābhatā), nonconceptuality (nirvikalpatā) and reliability (avisaṃvāditā), should be taken at face value. To put it in other words, I shall attempt to demonstrate why, though of an admittedly much higher type, the yogins' perception of the (Buddhist) truths does not differ from ordinary perception.
THE CAREER OF A YOGIN
On Ordinary Persons (pṛthagjana) and Nescience (avidyā)
1.1. Pṛthagjanatva. The intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory condition from which a yogin wishes to free himself is traditionally described as the state of an ordinary/worldly person (pṛthagjanatva). Buddhist definitions of this state are of a mainly negative character: the ordinary person is one in whose psychic stream the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), the four noble truths (āryasatya) or, to be more precise, the supramundane (lokottara) noble factors (āryadharma), have not yet arisen (see below §3.2). According to the Sautrāntikas, the state of an ordinary person -which is denied any reality as a separate entity 2 -is to 2 The Vaibhāṣikas, some of whom at least classify pṛthagjanatva as a factor dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktadharma), define pṛthagjanatva as follows (AKBh 66,9-12 together with AK 2.40bc 1 ): mārgasyāprāptir iṣyate | pṛthag-janatvam | pṛthagjanatvaṃ katamat | āryadharmāṇām alābha iti śāstrapāṭhaḥ | alā-bhaś ca nāma aprāptiḥ |. " [T] he non-possession of the noble path is held to be the nature of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva). As the śāstra states: 'What is the nature of an ordinary person? It is the non-acquisition of the noble factors.' Nonacquisition is a synonym for non-possession." Translation (of Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra 399a) in Cox 1995: 202 . According to Cox (1995: 223n. 102) , śāstra here refers to Jñānaprasthāna 2, 298c5ff, and Mahāvibhāṣā 45, 232b9ff: "What is the nature of an ordinary person? The nature of an ordinary person is the present, past, and future non-possession of noble factors, noble heat, noble views, noble patience, noble inclination, and noble insight." Translation in Cox 1995: 223n. 102. be defined as follows 3 : "The state of an ordinary person is the stream in which the noble factors have not arisen." Not surprisingly, Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika definition coincides with the one put forth by Yogācāras, who hold the state (gnas skabs = avasthā?) of an ordinary person to be one in which the supramundane (lokottara) noble dharmas have not arisen (ma bskyed pa = anutpanna?). 4 Idealist sources moreover regard the state of an ordinary person, which they also consider being besieged with erroneous clinging to (the notion of) person(s) and dharmas (pudgaladharmābhiniveśasaṃmoha), as the obstacle (āvaraṇa) that prevents one from entering the first Bodhisattva stage (bhūmi).
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Provided the yogin has not, still as an ordinary person, gone through (parts of) the so-called mundane path of cultivation (laukikabhāvanāmārga), his condition is characterized by entanglement in nescience (avidyā, or ignorance, ajñāna, delusion, moha) and the depravities, moral faults and defilements (āsrava, doṣa, [upa] kleśa, etc.) nescience is responsible for, all of which make one subject to rebirth See also Siddhi I.57-58. Note that, at least for the epistemologists, the category of arvāgdarśin ("jemand, dessen Erkenntnis von unserer Art ist, " Steinkellner 1979: 79n. 258 ) is wider than the category of p+thagjana: whereas the second refers to those who have not yet entered the path of vision/first Bodhisattva stage, the first is often though not systematically used as an equivalent of asarvadarśin ("nonomniscient"), i.e., seems to refer to all persons who are not Buddhas. 3 AKBh 66,20: anutpannāryadharmasantatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam |. The Mahāvibhāṣā (45, ascribes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the conception according to which pṛthagjanatva is no real entity (Cox 1995: 224n. 109 4 VinSg P77a8, as quoted by Kritzer (2005: 63) : so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ la gdags | rnam pa du yod ce na | smras pa | 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bskyed pa'i gnas skabs la'o ||. 5 According to SNS 9.5.1 (see Lamotte 1935: 240) , each stage or bhūmi opposes a specific type of error (saṃmoha), the first opposing pudgaladharmābhiniveśa-saṃmoha (SNS 127, (12) (13) : sa daṅ po la ni gaṅ zag daṅ chos la mṅon par źen pa kun tu rmoṅs pa). According to Vasubandhu's commentary on MS 5.1 (see Lamotte 1973: II.196 as well as II.39*, which contains numerous bibliographical references to pṛthagjanas), pṛthagjanatva opposes the first stage. Siddhi II.642 explicitly identifies the SNS's saṃmoha to Vasubandhu's pṛthagjanatā, the latter being defined as the (bījas of the) kleśa°and jñeyāvaraṇa of the speculative type (see Siddhi II.639-640 as well as II.590).
(punarjanman) and re-existence (punarbhava), i.e., to the intrinsically painful (duḥkha) cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra). 6 On p+thagjanas in epistemological literature, see PVP D195a2-3/P227b6, PVṬ Ñe D205b2/P253b2-3 (ad PV 3.217b; for the context, see be defined as "the false view of self and one's own (ātmātmīyadṛṣṭi), clinging (abhiniveśa) and 'mentalization' (sems la 'jog pa) with regard to the five constituents-of-personality being clung to (upādāna-skandha) ." According to all the schools mentioned -the Yogācāras, the Sautrāntikas, and epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti -this false view of self is twofold, viz. speculative (parikalpita VinSg, ASBh, LAV, PVP, PVṬ, vikalpita AKBh) and innate/spontaneous (sahaja). 13 The speculative false view of self characterizes heretics (anyatīrthya, VinSg), i.e., substantialist philosophers such as Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣi-kas (AKVy), 14 and arises out of the meditation on (heterodox) treatises (śāstracint [an] ādi, PVṬ). 15 The innate view of self is common to puerile worldly people (bālapṛthagjana, VinSg) as well as to animals like antelopes and birds (mṛgapakṣin, VinSg, AKBh) 16 and arises out of beginningless latent tendencies (anādivāsanā, PVṬ).
17 According to Dharmakīrti, both the speculative and the innate false views of self characterize the type of living beings traditional Buddhist scholasticism classifies as ordinary persons.
Pratītyasamutpāda.
Nescience traditionally forms the first link in the Buddhist twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (pratī-tyasamutpāda) and as such at least indirectly conditions thirst or craving (tṛṣṇā, or love, sneha, or desire, rāga) . This craving is in turn regarded as the cause of suffering (duḥkhahetu), i.e., the factor that prompts deluded people to act in order to quench their thirst, hence to ba lta ba daṅ | mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba źes bya'o || de'aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste | lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa'o || de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na ri dags daṅ bya rnams kyi yaṅ yin no || kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi yin par blta bar bya'o ||. 13 LAV 117, 13, AKBh 290, [19] [20] [21] , VinSg (see n. 12 above), PV 2.199 (see n. 47 below). Note that Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin call the first of these two kinds of satkāyadṛṣṭi "ābhisaṃskārikā;" Manorathanandin defines it as skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī (see PVA 139, [27] [28] [20] [21] [22] [23] has not yet gotten rid of those defilements that an ordinary person can eliminate by means of the mundane path of cultivation, the pṛthagjana is first and foremost typified by his erroneous superimposition of ego-related aspects onto the selfless constituents of reality, and by the correlative defilements that make him slave to saṃsāra and suffering.
The Idea of a Way Out
2.1. Gotra, kalyāṇamitra and the śrutamayī prajñā. There are some reasons to believe that at least some of Dharmakīrti's commentators and epigones assented to the (mainly) Mahāyānist doctrinal complex that entails such key notions as gotra ("family"), kalyāṇamitra ("spiritual friend"), bodhicitta ("thought of enlightenment") and praṇidhāna ("vow") . 22 Eltschinger (2008, n. 75) . Interestingly, the Buddha's Word seems to be ninemembered (navāṅga) rather than twelve-membered (dvādaśāṅga) in the few places it is mentioned by the epistemologists. See PVP D120b4-5/P139b3 (together with PVṬ Ñe D150b3-4/P186a2-3) and TSP K877,4-6/Ś1062,7-9. On this distinction, see Lamotte 1976: 157-159. like the following "wisdom born of (rational) reflection," the (novice) Bodhisattva obtains still as an ordinary person. 28 2.2. Cintāmayī prajñā. 29 The wisdom born of (rational) reflection mirrors the concerns of a human "type" who is ideally possessed of two properties: first, his desire to engage( pravṛttikāma) in a religious path and second, his practical rationality (prekṣāvattva, prekṣāpūrvakāritva) . At this stage, the (novice) Bodhisattva submits the scriptural contents he has previously heard/learnt to a rational inquiry (yukti) or examination (parīkṣā, vicāra, etc.) that mainly proceeds by means of inference (anumāna, sādhana). Wisdom born of (rational) reflection consists in an ascertainment (niścaya, nirṇaya)o f scriptural contents through the so-called means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), and results in (a) cognition(s) that is/are termed "agreeing with the means of valid cognition" (pramāṇasaṃvādin), i.e., whose objects (artha) have proved to stand critical analysis by means of pramāṇas (pramāṇa[pari]śuddhārtha, pramāṇa[pari]dṛṣṭārtha) and hence are deemed to be worthy of (religious) exertion/endeavour (abhiyogārha). Typical of this kind of object are the four Noble Truths, which form the core or principal point (pradhānārtha) of the Buddhist teaching and which a rational person subjects to inferential investigation in order to assess the reliability (avisaṃvāditva) of scriptures (āgama). In a philosophical narrative, 131cd-132ab present us with a mahāyānist account of the Bodhisattva's being struck by his own as well as the other living beings' suffering (duḥkhasatya). This of course needs not be further investigated since duḥkha is but an empirical fact. PV 2.132c-133ab and 135ac 1 account for the Bodhisattva's inquiry into the origin of suffering (samudayasatya), whereas PV 2.134bd and 135c 2 d describe his determination of the path leading to the destruction of suffering (mārgasatya). As to the destruction of suffering (nirodhasatya) itself, it cannot be made the object of an analysis, but merely be hinted at, which we can observe in PV 2.133cd-134a, with its characteristic allusion to nivṛtti.
On that passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005a: 397-408 and Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.4).
hence establish his mind (citta = vijñāna) in its naturally radiant (prabhāsvara) and flawless (nirāsrava) condition.
The Path to Salvation
3.1. Pratipakṣamārga. 31 According to Dharmakīrti, nescience consists in an erroneous perception (PV 2.213) that he identifies with the innate false view of self. This false view gives rise to thirst or craving, which is regarded as the cause of suffering. The yogin who is eager to rid himself of suffering will thus have to eliminate craving and other defilements by eradicating their cause. In other words, he will have to develop and cultivate the perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness, which acts as an antidote or antagonistic factor to the false view of self, in order to free himself from craving and suffering. This antagonism between avidyā = satkāyadṛṣṭi and nairātmyadarśana is based on the fact that these mutually opposing factors display contrary aspects of the object (viparītālambanākāra 34 See PVP D115b4-6/P134a5-8 and PVṬ Ñe D147b1-3/P182a5-8. 35 According to PVP D116a2-3/P134b4-5, Dharmakīrti shows now that the path is the counteracting factor because it is possessed with aspects that are contrary to the ones superimposed by nescience. 36 According to PVP D116a6/P135a1, once the perception of unsubstantiality has become coessential (sātmībhūta) with the mind through cultivation; on PVV 103,8 (subhāvitā sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsaprāptavaiśadyā), see below §3.5. Truths], conforms to (anurodhin) the real aspects of the thing 38 which are contradictory to the [ones falsely ascribed by ignorance]." 39 Nescience has one superimpose or grasp such unreal aspects as permanence. 40 Once craving and all kinds of defilements arise, they bear upon objects whose aspects have been superimposed. 41 Now the perception of unsubstantiality entails or goes along with the sixteen real aspects of the Noble Truths, 42 i.e., is provided with aspects thata re contradictory to those superimposed by nescience. Cultivating this perception to its maximum degree of intensity, i.e., up to the point where it becomes essential to the mind or the psychic stream, will annul not only the innate false view of self, but also all the defilements that it gives rise to by providing them with (pseudo-)objects. Such is the basic structure and goal of Dharmakīrti's path (mārga). Though this structure remains basically the same for all types of Buddhist yogins (Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas), differences are mainly concerned with the initial motivation (nimitta, prayojana) guiding the yogin, and hence with the length of the cultivation as well as with the quality or scope of the salvational result. 43 3.2. Darśanamārga. When he practiced rational reflection on scriptural contents, the yogin was still an ordinary person, and the compassion he was endowed with still bore upon a hypostasised notion of living beings (sattvālambana). 44 To put it in a more traditional way, we could say that at this stage, the yogin was a Bodhisattva who has formed the initial resolution (prathamacittotpādika), abiding in the so-called adhimukticaryābhūmi ("stage of zealous conduct"). The supramundane noble factors that an ordinary person is per definitionem bereft of are those that arise on the so-called path of vision/seeing (darśanamārga), which (normally) opens up the Buddhist religious path properly speaking and coincides, in a Mahāyānist perspective, with the Bodhisattva'se ntrance into the first stage (most commonly known as the "joyful stage," pramuditā bhūmiḥ). 45 The state of an ordinary person ceases as soon as the yogin has entered the path of vision 46 : at this time, the yogin becomes a noble person (ārya [pudgala] ) and enters the path of those who are undergoing religious training (śaikṣamārga). Like all the path structures that have been inherited from the Vaibhāṣika abhisamayavāda, Dharmakīrti's path is basically twofold, divided into a path of vision and a path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga, though both are here included in the broader category of bhāvanā). 3.3. Bhāvanāmārga. At the end of the path of vision, the śaikṣas of the śrāvaka type obtain the religious fruit or result (phala) they were a candidate for (pratipannaka) before entering the path. Depending on the extent to which they have, still as ordinary persons, eliminated the bhā-vanāheya defilements by means of a mundane path of cultivation, 53 they obtain the results of stream-enterer, once-returner and non-returner. 54 As such they are reborn, respectively, seven times in the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), or only once, or no more, before they reach emancipation from saṃsāra, i.e., nirvāṇa. The supramundane path of cultivation they still need in order to get rid of the remaining defilements is then extremely short. Highly different is the situation of the śaikṣa who is destined for Buddhahood and not for Arhatship, and who, still as an ordinary person, had made the vow to reach enlightenment in order to alleviate living beings' suffering by teaching them the path to liberation. As far as I can see, this Buddha-to-be still must rid himself of three major elements as he exits the path of vision.
(1) Like Hearers and Buddhasfor-themselves, he will have to uproot the innate false view of self together with its attendant defilements, but (2) unlike Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves, he will have to eliminate these defilements together with their traces or after-effects (vāsanā), which regularly manifest themselves in Arhats through corporeal, vocal or mental deficiencies (kāyavākcittavaiguṇya). (3) The Buddha-to-be still must uproot the so-called undefiled nescience or ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā, or°a jñāna, or°saṃmoha). To put it technically, the Bodhisattva must eradicate two kinds of obstacles (āvaraṇa) in addition to the innate false view of self: the obstacle that consists in the defilements together with their after-effect (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa), and the obstacle that conceals the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa). 55 Needless to say, this threefold uprooting demands an incomparably longer path of cultivation than that taken by Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves. 56 Whoever the yogin may be, the cultivation or repeated practice (abhyāsa) consists in the yogin's practicing (prayoga) or generating (utpādana, utpatti) repeatedly, "again and again" (punaḥ punaḥ, paunaḥpunyena), 57 the salvational means, viz., the perception of unsubstantiality, in order to finally reach a direct perceptual realization 58 (sākṣātkaraṇa) of it. entails various stages (bhūmi) as well as the parallel development of insight (prajñā, vipaśyanā) and compassion (karuṇā, kṛpā, dayā) . 59 In the most authoritative traditional accounts of a Bodhisattva's career (caryā), the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage (acalā DBhS, niyatā BoBh, or the tenth abode, vihāra BoBh) stands out as a decisive turning point. The Bodhisattva is now possessed of the "presentiment that dharmas (ultimately) have no arising" (anutpattikadharmakṣānti); from now on his progression is irreversible (avaivartika). Especially noteworthy is the fact that all the factors and operations characterizing him have now become spontaneous (< svarasena eva) on account of the intensity of the cultivation (bhāvanābāhulyāt), 60 and develop without any intentional effort (anābhogena).
3.4.
61 This pertains to the Bodhisattva's wisdom as well as to his compassion, which from now on can properly be termed "great compassion" (mahākaruṇā), and which no longer bears upon anything (anālambanā, because the Bodhisattva no longer sees sattvas or dharmas).
62 Note should also be made that the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage coincides with the acquisition of "unfixed" nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa).
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The epistemologists' assent to this complex of ideas can be easily documented. Dharmakīrti himself accepts the notion of an objectless compassion (anālambanā karuṇā), 64 which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇaka-gomin declare to be proper to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, in contradistinction to ordinary persons and noble beings (ārya), have rid themselves of the clinging to the object-subject dichotomy. 65 Dharmakīrti associates "great compassion" (mahatī kṛpā) with Bodhisattvas who are possessed of a durable substratum( sthirāśraya) and remain in saṃsāra (in contradistinction to Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas). 66 Last but not least, Dharmakīrti argues at length that compassion proceeds spontaneously (svarasena) as it becomes the very nature (svabhāva) of the psychic stream and no longer requires any effort (yatna) in order to increase. 67 The same doctrinal pattern also seems to obtain in the case of discernment (vipaśyanā), which, defined as "wisdom bearing upon unsubstantiality" (nairātmyālambanā prajñā), 68 is equivalent to the already mentioned perception of unsubstantiality and the counteracting path it defines. The yogin's nearly endless cultivation of nairātymadarśana gradually results in the latter's becoming "coessential" or "conatural" to the mind (citta), a process (or rather its result) thee pistemologists usually describe in terms of sātmya or sātmī-bhāva: after a certain point, the mind or the psychic stream (santāna) acquires discernment as its own nature, 69 which amounts to saying that it is coessential with the perceptiono r cultivation of unsubstantiality, also referred to as the path or the antidote of the defilements (doṣaprati-pakṣa/°vipakṣa). 70 86 But no less important here is the fact that, due to this nearly endless cultivation, the Bodhisattva has rid himself of the (nonproductive) trace or after-effect of defilements. This after-effect of defilements consists in a corporeal (kāya°), verbal (vāc°) and mental (buddhi°) defectiveness (vaiguṇya) or unwieldiness (akarmaṇyatā).
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This still affects liberated saints like the Arhat Maudgalyāyana, who kept hopping around because he had been born as a monkey 500 lifetimes earlier, or the Arhat Pilindavatsa who, because he had been a brāhmaṇa before, continued to say harsh and belittling words to his 83 On the āśrayaparivṛtti in Dharmakīrti's works, see Eltschinger 2005b 85 As a tāyin or "protector" of the living beings (see PV 2.145-146ab). 86 PVP D61a2-3/P69b5-7 (Eltschinger 2005a: 424) . See Kośa 7. 110-112 (Pruden 1991 : IV.1166 -1167 . 87 See PV 2.141c. fellow monks. 88 In other words, the (Bodhisattva/)Buddha has eliminated the obstacle consisting of defilements together with their aftereffects (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa). But yet another type of abandonment distinguishes him from Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas: contrary to them (or to Arhats), a Buddha has rid himself of unskilfulness in teaching the path (mārgoktyapaṭutā), 89 which I interpret as Dharmakīrti's allusion to undefiled ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā,°ajñāna,°saṃmoha) . 90 If this hypothesis holds good, we can safely consider our Bodhisattva's transmutation of the basis also to entail the elimination of the obstacle that conceals the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa, and hence an omniscience of the sarvasarvajñatā-type), for the equation akliṣṭāvidyā = jñeyāvaraṇa is easy to document in Buddhist Mahāyāna literature. 91 Moreover, most of the definitions of āśrayaparivṛtti include the elimination of both obstacles, the epistemologists being no exception.
THE COGNITION OF A YOGIN

Yogijñāna as an Epistemological Topic
Let us now turn to the epistemological dimension of yoga proper.
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Dharmakīrti devotes two main passages to the so-called perception of 88 On the vāsanāsamudghāta, see , Traité IV.1755 -1758 , and Eltschinger 2005a 93 Among Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga (480-540?) is likely to have been the first one to discuss the perception of mystics within the general framework of perception (pratyakṣa) as a means of valid cognition. However, the following statement seems to exhaust Dignāga's opinion on the subject: "[T]he yogin's intuition of a thing in itself unassociated (avyatibhinna) with the teacher's instruction [is also a type of perception]. The yogin's perception which is not associated (avyavakīrṇa) with any conceptual construction of āgama (the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception." Hattori's (1968: 27) translation of PS 1.6cd and PSV thereon. Sanskrit texts (< Vibh. 191n. 3 and 203n . 1) in Hattori 1968: 94 nn. 1.48 (yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk) and yogins (yogipratyakṣa), 94 both of which refer their reader back to the religious ideas we have considered so far, i.e., to the religious philosophy as expounded in PV 2. What do yoga and yogins consist of? Dharmottara (740-800) is one of the few authors to supply any substantial definitions of these two terms. According to ordinary understanding (loka), yoga consists of (psychic) concentration (samādhi), but according to (Buddhist) authoritative treatises (śāstra), it consists of tranquillity (of mind, śamatha) and discernment (vipaśyanā), which have (psychic) concentration and insight (prajñā) for their nature (°ātman), respectively. A yogin is one who is possessed of tranquillity of mind and discernment into the nature of things, one who strives for constant concentration (< nityasamāhita) and discrimination of true reality (tattvapravicaya?). 
(yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanaṃ pratyakṣam).
Steinkellner's reconstruction of PS(V) 1.6ab reads as follows: yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyavakīrṇārthamātradṛk |. Note that PSV is also quoted in PVP D210b3/P246b56. Interestingly enough, Dignāga's presentation is based on two notions the subsequent tradition will seemingly disregard. First, the perception of yogins grasps a "thing in itself" (arthamātra); this expression I do not dare interpret further than Jinendrabuddhi's comment to the effect that°mātra ("only," "in itself" in Hattori's translation) aims at excluding superimposed objects (PSṬ 56,15-57,1: mātraśabdo 'dhyāropitārthavyavacchedārthaḥ |). Second, this perception is totally free from, or unmixed with scriptural concepts (āgamavikalpa), which on the one side matches the definitory non-conceptuality of perception well, but on the other side seems to conflict with the subsequent tradition's insistence upon the four Noble Truths (on this point, see Franco in present volume). PVin 1.27, 8 ; see also NB 1.11. On yogipratyakṣa, see Vetter 1964 : 41, Steinkellner 1978 , McDermott 1991 , Pemwieser 1991 : 21-50, Dreyfus 1997 Let us start with Dharmakīrti's definition of perception in his PVin and NB, and disregard the possible evolution of his ideas on this topic (cf. Franco, forthcoming). In PVin 1.4ab 1 , Dharmakīrti defines perception as cognition that is free from conceptual thought (kalpanā-poḍha) and is non-erroneous (abhrānta), 96 conceptual thought being in turn characterized as a cognition whose appearance or image may be expressed verbally. 97 We may thus offer two defining conditions that the cognition of a yogin must meet in order to be termed a "perception": first, it must be non-conceptual (and hence its content cannot be adequately expressed by words); second, it must be non-erroneous and reliable/non-belying (avisaṃvādin). The criterion of a given cognition's non-conceptual character lies in its presenting a clear or vivid (spaṣṭa, sphuṭa) appearance or image. The vividness and hence the non-conceptuality of a yogin's cognition comes from the fact that this cognition is born of cultivation (bhāvanāmaya, etc.) ." As Dharmottara has it, 101 "due to cultivation, [this cognition] appears vividly; because it appears vividly, [this cognition] is established (siddha) as non-conceptual; since it bears upon an entity that has been 'purified' by the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa-pariśuddhavastuviṣaya), [this cognition] is non-erroneous; therefore, why should it not be a perception, [if all] the other perceptions also appear vividly, are non-conceptual and non-erroneous?" A cognition's being the outcome of the intense cultivation of an object by no means implies that the said cognition bears upon a real (bhūta) object (artha, viṣaya) . Dharmakīrti adduces several examples in order to show thatt he cultivation of unreal (abhūta) objects may also result in a vivid and hence non-conceptual cognition. 104 This is to be inferred on the basis of these persons' outward behaviour, as Dharmakīrti says 105 : "Since we see that, in accord with the delusion [they are the victims of], they act with agitation." Somee xplanations may not be out of place. By "agitation" (āvega), we should understand physical states such as trembling with joy, or being thrilled (romaharṣa). By "behaviour" is meant a physical action (anuṣṭhāna) that conforms to the specific vision of a deluded person: the first will stretch his arms out in order to embrace his beloved, the second mourns or sighs, and the third boastfully seizes a sword. 106 But one may also wonder why the cognition at stake should be of an immediate (pratyakṣa) rather than of a mediate (parokṣa) character. 107 This Dharmakīrti answers as follows 108 : "Because we do not see any behaviour of that kind when [someone] is conscious that his/her cognition is a mediate one (parokṣa)."
However, cultivating unreal objects is by no means limited to deluded or passionate people. The Buddhist meditation exercises that build up, among other things, the (remote) preparatory path (prayogamārga) are also endowed with utterly unreal objects, as Dharmakīrti tells us in both his PV and PVin 109 : "We hold that, though [they are] unreal, the loathsome, the totality of earth, etc., which are created by force of cultivation, are vivid and [hence]n on-conceptual." This includes meditation such as cognizing a corpse turning blue (vinīlaka) or rotting (vipūyaka), or of a corpse that has become a skeleton (asthi- 110 or meditation that has all entities (vastu) appearing as the earth, or as water, as they have unreal objects despite the fact that the image they display is perfectly clear once the cultivation process has been completed. 111 The reason why these meditations have unreal objects is, according to Vaibhāṣikas and to Dharmottara, that they consist in acts of attention that are directed towards imaginary or, better, volitional objects (adhimuktimanas[i]kāra). 112 Since they arise from intensive cultivation of their objects, the aforementioned direct or immediate cognitions display a vivid image and hence are non-conceptual. In this respect, they all meet the first defining condition of a perception. But since they bear upon imaginary or volitional objects such as a beloved, an enemy or a putrefying corpse, they fail to meet the second. As belying/unreliable (visaṃvādin, asaṃvādin) cognitions, they do not lay claim to the "validity" that is inherent in a true perception. As Dharmakīrti himself says, 113 "among these [vivid and non-conceptual cognitions that result from cultivation, 114 116 " The condition of a yogic cognition's reliability lies in its bearing on an object that has proved to stand critical analysis by means of pramāṇas. In other words, this object must have been submitted to rational inquiry( yukti), "purified" ([pari]śuddha) or ascertained as agreeing (saṃvādin) with the means of valid cognition. This is tantamount to saying that the object of a yogin's cognition is one that has been reflected upon (< √cint), examined (< vi√car) or ascertained (< niś√ci, vyava√sthā caus , nir√nī) Note should be made in this connection that the cognition at stake is said to be "born of cultivation" (bhāvanāmaya), which the commentators explain as "caused by cultivation" (bhāvanāhetu [niṣ-patti] ka), 126 an expression that matches Dharmakīrti's own formulations well (bhāvanāja, bhāvanābalanirmita, bhāvanābalaniṣpanna, bhāvanā-balataḥ 127 ) . In other words, this cognition does not consist in cultivation, but arises at the very end of cultivation, once the cultivation proc-ess has been completed (bhāvanāpariniṣpattau, tanniṣpattau 128 ). This is indeed the way Dharmakīrti accounts for yogijñāna in the definition he supplies in his NB 129 : "Arisen from the ultimate degree [reached by] the cultivation of a real object, the cognition of yogins, too[, is a direct perception]."
Yogijñāna in a Soteriological Perspective
5.1. Dharmakīrti repeatedly reminds his readers of the fact that he has already accounted for yogināṃ jñānam in the second chapter of his PV. This remark is a little puzzling insofar as this chapter does not provide any explicit treatment of the topic. Nevertheless, I think it supplies enough materials for us to proceed further in our interpretation of the yogin's cognition.
It is my contention that Dharmakīrti's account of the yogin's cognition as vivid, non-conceptual and non-belying refers to the mind's gnoseological condition at the end of the "cleansing" path, i.e., at the moment when all superimpositions and their concomitant defilements, even those of an extremely subtle nature, have been thoroughly and absolutely eliminated. In other words, Dharmakīrti's presentation concerns the mind or cognition of the mystic whose basis-of-existence has just been transmuted. The coincidence between Dharmakīrti's bhāvanā-pariniṣpattau in the context of yogijñāna and his remark to the effect that the basis-of-existence is transmuted due to the repeated practice of the path (tadabhyāsāt), is striking. It is brought out with particular clar- (Eltschinger 2005b: 185-186) , and TSP K872,27-873,7/Ś1056,21-25 (McClintock 2002 (vidyamānātmanā) . And this is [the object's and the cognition's original] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as it really is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object]." Dharmakīrti's presentation relies on a Sautrāntika doctrine, according to which direct perception is explained by the fact that the object casts or "projects" (arpaṇa) its own aspect (ākāra) and hence generates the cognition itself. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the third chapter of the same work 135 : "Experts on rational inquiry consider that to be an object/be perceptible consists in being a cause [which is] capable of projecting a [true] aspect [of itself] onto the cognition." I believe we are left with no other possibility than to accept the alleged reality of the aspects the entity casts onto consciousness. As Devendrabuddhi makes clear, 136 these real aspects are those we already met in Dharmakīrti's description of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, impermanence, painfulness, emptiness, selflessness, etc. The conclusion is then easily drawn, as Kamalaśīla has it 137 : "It has been settled that the original nature of the [mind/cognition] is to grasp the real aspects of the object. It has also been explained that the real nature of the objectconsists in momentariness, selflessness, etc. Therefore, [the mind] has but the grasping of unsubstantiality for its nature." In order to present us with the nature of cognition, the epistemologists resort to, and reinterpret accordingly, two highly valued traditional topoi, i.e., the alleged natural "luminosity" (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of the mind or cognition, 138 and the perception of true reality (tattvadarśana). Dharmakīrti describes the first in PV 2. of self, i.e., nescience, causes pṛthagjanas to superimpose sixteen unreal aspects onto the four Noble Truths, e.g., permanence, pleasantness, mine and I. Becausethey are attached to I and mine, or to self and one's own, ordinary beings crave for objects that delight the (pseudo-)self, and act accordingly in order to grasp them; they also develop aversion of whatever is deemed a threat to the self or itsa lleged property. Thus defilements and depravities arise out of the false view of self.
147 This is the situation that Dharmakīrti alludes to when he says that the mind or the cognition shifts from its own true nature.
148 But, as Dharmakīrti has it, this superimposing cognition is as uncertain or unsteady as the mistaken cognition of a piece of rope as snake at night in a place where one may suspect the presence of snakes. 149 In the same way, nescience and the superimpositions it is responsible for, no matter how deeply rooted in the mind, are removable because they are adventitious or unnatural to the mind. Now what is needed to get rid of this shift? The epistemologists' answer is unambiguous: an ordinary person who is deluded by the false view of self must resort to the means of valid cognition and especially to inference. Here again we should remember that, still as an ordinary person, one may, on account of belonging to a specific "family" and/or having met a "spiritual friend" like a Buddha or an advanced Bodhisattva, listen to the Buddhist scriptures and hence develop faith or conviction (adhimukti), but one may also set about rationally reflecting upon scriptural contents by means of pramāṇas. This rational inquiry, mainly consisting of the ascertainment of the true aspects of the Noble 147 See § §1.1-3 above. 148 We should, however, be cautious not to ascribe to him the mythological notion of a "fall" or decay of the mind that would in turn imply the path to consist in the gradual recovery of a lost condition. Nescience is abeginningless (anādi) erroneous perception (mithyopalabdhi) that arises out of its own seeds (bīja) or latent tendencies (vāsanā) and that has been nourished by, and nourishes in turn, the so-called incorrect judgement (ayoniśomanaskāra Truths, aims at shaping the salvational means (upāya), i.e., the perception of unsubstantiality as an antagonistic or opposing factor of satkāyadṛṣṭi. There can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti's vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam (PV 2.207c) refers in the first place to the inferential analysis that is typical for the cintāmayī prajñā.
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As we have seen above, the cultivation of the salvational means that the yogin carries out is simultaneously of a cognitive and cleansing character. The more our yogin sharpens his realization of the Truths and their corresponding aspects, the more he succeeds in uprooting the opposite false views as well as the superimpositions and defilements they are responsible for. But eradicatingt he adventitious impurities amounts to gradually freeing the mind of those malignant obstacles that prevented it from grasping the object as it really is, i.e., with its real aspects of impermanence, emptiness, etc. During the path of vision, the yogin gets rid of gross superimpositions such as those the speculative false view of self gives rise to. Much more difficult to eliminate however, is the innate false view of self, along with the remaining defilements (i.e., the bhāvanāheyakleśas) and their productive and nonproductive vāsanās, the uprooting of which, in many Mahāyānist accounts, necessitates no less than eight complete stages or bhūmis (bhū-mis 2-9). During the first six of these bhūmis (2-7), the yogin must devote constant effort and "intentionality" (vikalpa) to his cultivation of the cleansing means; during the last two bhūmis (8-9), insight becomes spontaneous, effortless, and unintentional. The removal of the most subtle categories of bad dispositions now proceeds as "automatically" or "naturally" as the perception of unsubstantiality itself. At the end of the path of cultivation, the entire filth of impurities has been irreversibly destroyed, a psychological and existential situation described as a transmutation of the basis-of-existence. Now the mind only consists of the path; it has the perception of unsubstantiality or discernment for its unique and indestructible nature. Dharmakīrti describes this as fol- [mind] that [once the practice of nairātmyadarśana has been completed, cultivation, has freed the cognition of the obstacles that avidyā was ultimately responsible for; in other words the mind is now free from the obstacle that concealed the knowable. Of the real and pramāṇa-ascertained aspects the object imposes upon it, which are the real aspects of the four Noble Truths, the mind can have but a vivid and hence nonconceptual image. In other words: whereas the cintāmayī prajñā, i.e., the (initially purely conceptual) ascertainment of true reality by means of pramāṇas, is responsible for the reliability of the yogin's cognition, the bhāvanāmayī prajñā gradually frees the mind of the defilements in such a way that the aspects objects cast upon it appear vividly. Irrespective of all subsequent interpretations of the yogināṃ jñānam, this in my opinion is what Dharmakīrti has in mind when he rather cryptically describes the cognition of yogins.
I would like to add a final remark. As far as I know, Dharmakīrti does not describe the nature of discernment during the path itself, i.e., before the āśrayaparivṛtti takes place. Now it is clear that, before entering the path of vision, the yogin has but an inferential and hence conceptual notion of such real aspects as impermanence, emptiness and the like. I would incline towards considering that his cognition of them remains a conceptual one, albeit extremely refined and hence vivid, throughout the path. But we ought not to forget that the mind is a purely momentary entity: the cognition that the path or the cultivation generates again and again may well be nothing like the cognition of the liberated one. This is exactly whatt he following stanzas of the Paramārthagāthās account for 159 : "39. 388,19-389,4, and Eltschinger 2005b: 190-192. 
